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INTRODUCTION
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals, or White Commission,' ("the Commission") recently issued
a report and recommendations for Congress and the President after studying the appellate courts for a year.2 The Commission investigation emphasized the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as
Congress had instructed. The centerpiece of the Commission's recommendations was a divisional arrangement for the Ninth Circuit and the
remaining appellate courts as their caseloads increase. 3 Notwithstanding
* Professor of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to thank Michael Higdon,
Mary LaFrance and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions and Jim Rogers for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine.
I It is referred to as the White Commission because Retired Supreme Court Justice
Byron R. White chaired it.
2 See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (Dec. 18, 1998) available at http://app.comm. uscourts.gov /final/appstruc.pdf Ihereinafter COMMISSION REPORTI; see also id. at 93-99 (providing "proposed
statutes to implement Commission recommendations" on which senators based S.253, 106th
Cong. (1999)). For analysis of the Commission report and recommendations, see Carl Tobias,
A Federal Appellate System for the Twenty-First Centuryv, 74 WASH. L. REV. 275, 299-312
(1999).
3 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 40-50, 60-62. For critiques of the divisional
arrangement which the Commission recommended, see Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest
Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
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this focus on the Ninth Circuit, the commissioners compiled a substantial
amount of objective empirical data and some subjective information on
such
the other regional circuits, while proffering additional prescriptions,
4
as two-judge and district court appellate panels for those courts.
The Commission also studied and collected considerable material
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Commission members assessed "two types of cases that have frequently been
discussed as potential candidates for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction,
including the key reasons advanced for centralized review." 5 The commissioners submitted these to Congress, without recommendation, "for
its use as it examines the needs of the federal appellate system in the
future."

16

The Commission characterized the legislative creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982 as "the most significant and innovative structural
alteration in the federal intermediate appellate tier since its establishment." 7 Moreover, the commissioners observed that Congress intended
the Federal Circuit to have exclusive jurisdiction over categories of appeals as to which there would be "a perceived need for centralized, nationwide review" in the future." This essay analyzes those aspects of the
Commission's investigation, report, and prescriptions that are applicable
to the Federal Circuit.
Part I evaluates the background of the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Court of Appeals and the analysis that the
entity performed. Part II explores the features of the commissioners' investigation that implicate the Federal Circuit. 1 find that the information
which the Commission assembled does not permit conclusive determinations about any of the appellate courts, including the Federal Circuit.
However, the commissioners examined tax and social security appeals
for the benefit of senators and representatives, because they may be appropriate, albeit controversial, candidates for Federal Circuit review.
Additional categories of cases might warrant similar review. Part III,
therefore, provides suggestions for the future.
377, 381-93 (2000); Federal Courts-Proposed Changes to the Ninth Circuit and the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 113 HARV. L. REV. 822, 824-27 (2000) [hereinafter Critique].
4 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 62-66.
5 See id. at 73.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 72; see also Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, tit. 1,
96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)). See generally' 17 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4104 (Supp. 1999). For numerous articles discussing the Federal Circuit, see United
States Court of Appeals fir the Federal Circuit Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41
AM. U. L. REV. 559-1074 (1992).
8 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73.
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I. BACKGROUND: THE COMMISSION AND ITS WORK
The origins and development of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals require limited assessment in
this essay, because that background has received considerable scrutiny
elsewhere. 9 Nevertheless, some examination is appropriate, as the Commission's history is relevant to the investigation undertaken by the Commission, particularly its evaluation of the Federal Circuit.
Senators and representatives authorized the Commission principally
in response to continuing controversy that involved the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit."' The enormous magnitude of
the Ninth Circuit has prompted calls for the court's realignment almost
since Congress established the appellate system in 1891.1j Over the
course of the last eighteen years, members of Congress have orchestrated
a number of campaigns to restructure the Ninth Circuit.' 2 Despite these
concerted efforts, Congress authorized an assessment in November
1997.13 The legislation accorded the commissioners one year to study
the "structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system,
with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," and to write a report with
recommendations for those "changes in circuit boundaries or structure as
may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of the
caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent with fundamental
4
concepts of fairness and due process."'

9 See, e.g., Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Structural Alternatives ftr the Federal
Court of Appeals' Final Report: An Analysis of the Commission's Recommendations fir the
Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 887, 892-94 (1999): Jennifer E. Spreng, Three Divisions
in One Circuit? A Critique ofthe Recommendations fron the Commissiot on Structural Alternativesfir the Federal Courts of Appeals, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 553, 554-60 (1999); Carl Tobias,
Suggestions fir Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49 FLA. L. REV. 189, 196-214 (1997).
I()COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. See generally Hellman, supra note 3, at
378-81; NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, S. REs. 104-197,

104th Cong. (1995).
1I See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33. See generally Critique, supra note 3, at

822: Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L. J. 1357, 1363-64
(1995).
12 See, e.g., S.431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 948, 101st Cong.
(1989); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34.

See generally Jennifer E.

Spreng, The Icebox Cometh: A Former Clerk's View of the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73
WASH. L. REV. 875, 876-879 (1998); Tobias, supra note 2, at 280-94.
13 See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2491 (1997) [hereinafter Agencies
Appropriations Act]. See generally Hellman, supra note 3, at 378-81; Hug, supra note 9, at
892-94: Spreng, supra note 9, at 560.
14 Agencies Appropriations Act § 305(a)(l)(B). See generally Tobias, supra note 9, at
206-I1.
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The commissioners carefully discharged their responsibilities in
studying the federal appellate courts.' 5 During 1998, the Commission
solicited written public input and conducted six public hearings. 16 However, the 89 witnesses who testified in those proceedings recommended
no major reforms for the Federal Circuit.' 7 The commissioners also received considerable assistance from the Federal Judicial Center
("FJC") 18 and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
("Administrative Office") 19 , the federal courts' principal research and
administrative arms, which Congress empowered the Commission to
consult. 2 ) Judicial Center employees undertook a number of assessments
and helped develop surveys that the commissioners circulated to federal
appeals and district court judges and appellate lawyers, seeking their perspectives on circuit operations. 2 ' The Commission also assembled, analyzed, and synthesized a significant amount of statistical information,
such as the percentage of cases decided in which the courts hear oral
arguments or publish an opinion, the amount of time the courts require to
decide cases, and the measures the courts use to deal with docket
22
pressures.
The commissioners reviewed all of the material that they had collected or received and in October 1998 published a tentative draft report
and recommendations.2 3 The Commission solicited public comments on
15 In this paragraph, I rely substantially on COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-6;
Tobias, supra note 2, at 295-98.
16 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3. See generallyv Joseph N. Akrotirianakis et al., lerr',-Building the Road to the Future: An Evaluation of the White Commission
Report on Structural Alternatives fin- the Federal Courts of Appeals, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
355, 362 (1999). The Commission conducted no hearing in Washington, D.C. where the Federal Circuit is located: instead members of the Commission met with judges of the Federal
Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and with representatives of the
Department of Justice and the White House Counsel's Office, to seek their views on the Federal Circuit. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3.
17 See generally Spreng, supra note 9, at 562-63. The hearing transcripts indicate also
that no judges of the Federal Circuit testified. See also Commission on Structural Alternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Working Papers 343-344 (1998) Ihereinafter WORKING
PAPERS[.

18 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1994) (authorizing the FJC).
19 28 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (authorizing the Administrative Office).
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-4: see also Agencies Appropriations Act,
supra note 13, at § 305(a)(4)(D); Hug, supra note 9, at 893.
21 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 4; WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 391. See generally Akrotirianakis et al., supra note 16, at 362.
22 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-25, 39; see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIIEE
109 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORTI (stating that
caseload increases have transformed the circuits).
23 See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT (Oct. 7, 1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT
REPORTI. See generallv Hug, supra note 7, at 893-94; Spreng, supra note 12, at 877-78;
Tobias, supra note 2, at 298.
20
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the report over a 30-day period. 24 However no judges of the Federal
Circuit tendered comments, and very few individuals or institutions submitted responses that specifically addressed the court. 25 After assessing
the public comments, the Commission issued a final report and suggestions that differed only minimally from the tentative report. 26 The linchpin of the commissioners' suggestions was a divisional arrangement for
the Ninth Circuit and the remaining regional circuits as their caseloads
increase. 27 Particularly relevant to the issues treated in this paper, however, was the Commission's decision to remove copyright appeals from
its examination of cases that frequently have been mentioned as possible
candidates for exclusive Federal Circuit jurisdiction. 28 This was the
most significant difference between the final and draft reports. 29
The commissioners retained, essentially intact, the tentative draft report's assessment of tax and social security matters as classes of appeals
that might be added to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, and transmitted the analysis to Congress, without recommendation, for
lawmakers' use in evaluating the future needs of the federal appellate
system. 3 1 The commissioners also gathered considerable information on
the Federal Circuit. The next section of this essay examines the discussion of the Federal Circuit in the Commission report and the material the
commissioners assembled on the Federal Circuit.
II.

ANALYSIS: THE COMMISSION'S WORK ON THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT

The Commission's information-gathering and report focused primarily on the twelve regional circuits. 3' In fact, the Working Papers com24 See Tobias, supra note 2, at 298.
25 For comments on the Commission Report, see http://app.comm.uscourts.gov /report/
comments.html.
26 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2.
27 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at iii., 40-47, 59-76. See generally Hug, supra

note 9, at 897-98: Spreng, supra note 9, at 577-86: Tobias, supra note 2, at 304-10.
28 Copyright cases had received a paragraph of discussion in the tentative draft report.
See COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 23, at 64-65. That discussion was
omitted in the final report. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73-74. See generally

Paul Michel, The Court ofAppealsfrr the Federal Circuit Must Evolve to Meet the Challenges
Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1182 (1999).
29 The American Intellectual Property Law Association strongly opposed extending Federal Circuit jurisdiction to include copyright appeals. See Letter from Michael E. Kirk, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association, to the Commission on
Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998), at http://
app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/PropLaw.htm (on file with the Cornell Journal of
Law and Public Policy).
31 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-74. See generally Michel, supra note
28.
31 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. This emphasis comported with the

Commission's statutory mandate. See also Agencies Appropriations Act, supra note 13.
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missioned by the commissioners included very little empirical data on
the Federal Circuit. 32 Nevertheless, the Commission assembled some
empirical data and additional subjective information on the Federal Circuit, and provided a relatively brief discussion on the Federal Circuit, in
33

its report.

A.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

I.

Discussion of the Federal Circuit in the Commission Report

In the introductory paragraph of Chapter Five of the Commission
Report, titled "Appellate Jurisdiction," the Commission stated that it
made "no recommendations on what matters should come into the federal courts."'34 However, one Commission member, Circuit Judge Gil-

bert S. Merritt, joined by the Commission chair, Retired Supreme Court
Justice Byron R. White, wrote separately to propose the substantial modification of diversity jurisdiction. 35 Moreover, the Commission proffered
several important "recommendations on where and how appellate review
36
of some of those matters might be best structured."
Even though the commissioners stated that the report emphasized
the twelve regional circuits, the Commission lauded the Federal Circuit
as the most important and creative structural modification in the federal
intermediate appellate system since its establishment. 3 7 The Commission explained that the Federal Circuit lacks geographical boundaries and
supra note 17, at 93 Ibis.1-3. For discussions of increasCircuit,
see Michel, supra note 28, at 1180-81, 1186-87, 1194;
ing interest in the Federal
Jonathan Ringel, Still Standing, He Finally Takes a Seat, LEGAL TIMES, June 5, 2000, at 10.
3' See CoMMissioN REPORT, stqpra note 2, at 21, 72-74.
34 Id. at 67 (emphasis in original). The Commission recognized that "significant changes
need to be made in the jurisdiction of the federal district courts," but a majority of the commissioners seemed constrained by the "statutory charge [against makingl recommendations in that
regard." The Commission did, however, admonish Congress to exercise "restraint in conferring new jurisdiction on the federal courts." Id.at 6.
35 See id. at 77-84: see also Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice
Byron R. White (Oct. 22, 1998), at http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/ comments/chietj.pdf
(commending the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals'
Draft Report) (on file with the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy). For discussions of
limitations on federal jurisdiction, see generally FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 35-53; JuD.
CONF. OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 21-39 (1995) [hereinafter
32

See, e.g.,

WORKING PAPERS

LONG RANGE PLANI: JUDITH McKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

36 COMMISSION REPORT,
RANGE

PLAN,

141-53 (1993).

supra note 2, at 67 (emphasis in original). See generally

LONG

supra note 35, at 134-35 (discussing alternatives for limiting federal

jurisdiction).
37

See

COMMISSION

REPORT,

supra note 2, at 72, See generally

WRIGHT, MILLER

&

COOPER, supra note 7, at § 4104: Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Studv ill

Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing origins of Federal Circuit); Daniel
J. Meador, The Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 581
(1992).
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that its jurisdiction is defined in two distinct ways. 3x First, the Federal
Circuit exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over determinations issued by a number of lower courts and administrative entities, including
the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, the Court
39
of Veterans Appeals, and the Merit Systems Protection Board.
Second, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving specific subject matter that arise from all 94 of the federal district courts. 411 The principal category is comprised of suits for patent

infringement. 4' Otherwise, the Federal Circuit is organized similarly to
the remaining appellate courts: it has twelve legislatively authorized appellate judgeships, a clerk of court, and a support staff which includes a
comparatively small number of central staff attorneys. 42 The Federal
Circuit is the only appeals court that Congress has specifically authorized
to employ a staff of technical advisors to assist the judges in resolving
43
the complicated issues that patent disputes frequently involve.
The commissioners also explained why Congress had created the
Federal Circuit in 1982. 44 They stated that senators and representatives

were not only providing for then-current conditions but also affording the
federal appellate system a new resource: an appeals court in which Congress could vest exclusive appellate jurisdiction over additional classes
of cases as to which the need for centralized review might subsequently
38 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See generally Conserving Jludicial Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation oJ.udgeships in the U.S. Courts of Appeals
fi- the Second and Eighth Circuits and the First, Third, and Federal Circuits: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee On Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,, 105th Cong. 104 (1998) (statement of Federal Circuit Chief Judge Glenn L. Archer,
Jr.) [hereinafter Archer Statement].
39 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72: see also Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1994)). See generally CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS, ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1 (1999) [hereinafter FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS]; Michel, supra note

28, at 1178-79.
41 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See generally Archer Statement, supra
note 38, at 104; WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 7, at § 4104.
41 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See generally Archer Statement, supra
note 38, at 104: LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 43 (recognizing that centralized review
is beneficial with regard to technical subject matter); Michel, supra note 28, at 1180-81 (detailing a significant increase in patent cases heard per year from the early 1990s to the late 1990s);

Victoria Slind-Flor, Federal Circuit Judged Flawed, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 3, 1998, at Al ("The
nation's dependence on technological innovation has pushed the once obscure U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit center stage.").
42 See COMMISSION REPORT, su)ra note 2, at 72. See generally Archer Statement, supra
note 38, at 104-05 (discussing Federal Circuit staff's small size); FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS,
supra note 39, at 2.
43 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72. See generally Archer Statement, supra
note 38, at 105 (setting out obligations of technical advisors); Slind-Flor, supra note 41 (noting
presence and role of technical advisors).
44 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73.
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arise. 45 The Commission observed that an important recommendation
included in the 1995 Long Range Plan prepared by the Judicial Conference of the United States urged that the appellate function be performed
"primarily in a generalist court of appeals established in each regional
circuit; and a Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with nationwide
46
jurisdiction in certain subject-matter areas.
The commissioners proffered no particular prescriptions regarding
other categories of cases that Congress could usefully assign to the Federal Circuit. 47 The commissioners did, however, examine tax and social
security appeals as two specific classes of cases that are often "discussed
as potential candidates for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction" and analyzed the principal reasons that observers of the federal courts have traditionally articulated for centralized review of these cases. 48 The
Commission transmitted these ideas, absent recommendation, to
lawmakers to employ when scrutinizing the future needs of the federal
4
appellate systen. '
The commissioners first discussed tax cases, observing that at least
since the mid-twentieth century, judges, attorneys, and legal scholars
have proposed that appeals in civil matters "arising under the Internal
511
Revenue Code be concentrated in one court of nationwide scope.
Lawyers and litigants currently take their appeals to the regional appel4- See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-73. See generallyv Meador, supra note 37
(detailing the origins of the Federal Circuit). Congress has assigned the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals and transferred to the Federal
Circuit the authority of the Temporary Court of Emergency Appeals ("TECA") after abolishing that court. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-73; see also FCSC REPORT, supra
note 22, at 73 (recommending that TECA cases be reassigned to the Federal Circuit, which
Congress subsequently did). See generally' WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 7, at
§ 4105 (discussing the jurisdiction of the TECA).
46 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73, citing LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at
43 (declining to propose that Congress create "new specialized or subject-matter courts in the
judicial branch" in part because their benefits would generally be less than the "well-known
dangers of judicial specialization")): see also 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994) (stating that the Judicial
Conference is the federal courts' policymaking arm).
47 See COMMISSION REPORT, sopra note 2, at 73. See generally Michel, supra note 28, at
1182-83.
48 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73-74. The final Commission report includes
essentially verbatim the material the Commission had incorporated in the tentative draft report.
Compare id. at 72-74 with COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFr REPORT, supra note 23, at 63-65.
49 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. For a similar examination, and more
specific recommendations, see LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 43.
5(1 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. Examples include Oscar E. Bland, Federal
Tax Appeals, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (1925); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of
Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1944): H. Todd Miller, A Court of Tax Appeals Revisited, 85 YALE L.J. 228 (1975); Roger John Traynor, Administrative and JudicialProcedure frw
Federal Income and Estate Gift Taxes - A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1393
(1938). But see James P. Holden, The Federal Courts Study Committee Has Not Made the
Case fir Its Proposed Overhaul of the Tax Litigation Process, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 639, 63940 (1991).
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late courts from the 94 federal district courts and the Tax Court. 51 Crit-

ics' primary concern with this arrangement is the inequities produced by
permitting parties to pursue appeals in all twelve regional circuits. 52 For

instance, citizens in different areas of the United States may sometimes
be subject to differing tax liabilities. 53 Planning is concomitantly complicated because infrequent Supreme Court review of tax cases often
leaves the interpretation of the tax law unsettled for years. 54
In 1979, the United States Senate Judiciary Committee conducted
extensive hearings on proposed legislation that would have created a
Court of Tax Appeals and generated substantial support for the idea.55
Moreover, the Federal Courts Study Committee's 1990 report suggested
that civil tax appeals be centralized in an Article III appellate division of
the Tax Court. 56 The commissioners admonished, however, that the Federal Circuit's existence obviates the necessity to create special tribunals
of this type. 57 Should senators and representatives decide to centralize
tax cases, the Commission concluded, the Federal Circuit would provide
a readily available forum. The court already adjudicates appeals in tax
matters that come to it from the Court of Federal Claims 58 and could
51 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73. The Commission denominated this
review structure as the "inverted pyramid." Id. See generally ROSWELL MAGILL, THE IMPACT
OF FEDERAL TAXES 206 (1943); Louis A. Del Cotto, The Needfi)r a Court of Tax Appeals: An
Argument and a Study, 12 BuFF. L. REV. 5 (1962-63).
52 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73; see also Sandra Jo Craig, Federal Income Tax and the Supreme Court: The Case Against a National Court of Tax Appeals, 1983
UTAH L. REV. 679; Miller, supra note 50, at 230. But see Holden, supra note 50, at 639-40,
644.
53 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73; see also Craig, supra note 52: Del

Cotto, supra note 51, at 6.
54 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73: see also Del Cotto, supra note 51; Miller,
supra note 50. But see Holden, supra note 50, at 639-4(0, 644.
55 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73; see also Federal Courts Improvement
Act (4 1979: Hearingson S.677 and S.678 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judicial', 96th Cong. 46-72 (1979) (statements of
Erwin Griswold, former Solicitor General and former dean, Harvard Law School; M. Carr
Ferguson, Assistant Attorney General, Tax Division, Department of Justice; and Daniel J.
Meador, Assistant Attorney General, Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice,
Department of Justice); Meador, supra note 37, at 610-14 (surveying the relevant history and
asserting that because of the controversial nature of the Court of Tax Appeals proposal and the
threat that it might prevent creation of the Federal Circuit, Congress deleted the proposal from
the bill authorizing the Federal Circuit).
56 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 73-74. "Article 1ll" judges serve with life

tenure. See FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 69: see also Holden, supra note 50, at 639. For a
discussion of the proposal to create an Article II division of the Tax Court and dissenting
statements, see FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 69-72.
57 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. See generally LONG RANGE PLAN,
supra note 35, at 43.
58 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. But

(f

Michel, supra note 28, at 1181, 1183

(questioning the propriety of expanding Federal Circuit jurisdiction generally, and to include
tax appeals specifically).
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absorb tax appeals from the Tax Court or all 94 of the federal district
courts.

59

The Commission examined social security appeals as a second category of cases that Congress might place within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Federal Circuit.61 1 Judges, administrators of the system, and other
observers had frequently recommended that Congress assign judicial review in social security cases - after final administrative agency action to an Article I court, which would relieve federal district courts of the
task.61 The Commission stated that it had reviewed these proposals but
made no recommendations, except that "they deserve the serious consideration of Congress. 6 2 Should lawmakers decide to establish an Article
I court for this purpose, the Commission reasoned, they might wish to
evaluate "placing exclusive appellate jurisdiction over that court in the
Federal Circuit. '63 The Commission seemed to consider this prospect
worthwhile, as the Federal Circuit already exercises jurisdiction over determinations of the Court of Veteran Appeals, an Article I court which
hears all appeals of adverse administrative action by the Veterans Administration. 64 The commissioners found that similarities between social
security and veterans' claims would make the placement of appellate review over them in one forum both "sensible and efficient. 6 5
59 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. In contrast, the American Bar Association Section of Taxation opposed centralization of tax appeals in one court. See Letter from
Stefan F. Tucker, Chair, ABA Commission on Taxation, to Justice Byron R. White. Chair,
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts (Nov. 6, 1998), at http://
app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/ABA-ST.pdf.
See generally Michel, supra note 28,
at 1183.
6(1 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. See generally JERRY MASHAW, Bu(1983) (evaluating effectiveness of adjudication of social security disability benefit claims); inji'a notes 80-86 and
accompanying text (analyzing the two studies of social security appeals that the Commission
commissioned).
61 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. The Federal Courts Study Committee
proffered a similar recommendation. See FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 55-58. See generally
Thomas Wilinsky, Mending the Safer , Net's SafeO , Net: The Federal Courts Study Committee's Proposal fi)rReforming the Social Security Disability Benefits Review Process, 18
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE. 1079 (1990/1991).
62 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. For examples of proposed legislation, see
H.R. 4419, 99th Cong. (1986); H.R. 4647, 99th Cong. (1986).
63 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. See generally Susan Haire & Stefanie
Lindquist, An Agency and 12 Courts: Social Security Disability Cases in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 80 JUDICATURE 230 (1997) (analyzing lack of uniformity among circuits and nonacquiescence by Social Security Administration in treating social security appeals).
64 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 74. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 502 (1994).
65 COMMISSION REPORT, sqpra note 2, at 74. If Congress so provided, the "standard of
review for veterans' appeals," which is limited to questions of constitutional and statutory
interpretation, would appear appropriate for social security matters. Id. But cf Michel, supra
note 28, at 1181-1183 (questioning the propriety of expanding Federal Circuit jurisdiction).
REAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS
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In the tentative draft report, the Commission also discussed copyright cases as a potential candidate for Federal Circuit jurisdiction. 66 The
tentative draft report observed that patents and copyrights are linked in
Article I of the Constitution, which provides for Congress to "promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. '67 Senators and representatives have invoked this authority to pass legislation that governs patents and copyrights, while observers have frequently emphasized the desirability of having nationally
uniform law cover both of these important areas. 6 8 Indeed, the commissioners remarked that. a perceived need for greater uniformity in the patent area was a principal motivating factor in the Federal Circuit's
creation. 6 9 Since that time, technological developments, including computers and electronic data processing, storage, and communication, have
caused dramatic changes in patents and copyrights, bringing "them together in ways that were unknown seventeen years ago." 71 These developments have led some observers to suggest that the same court be
assigned exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright claims. 7 ' This

discussion of copyright cases, however, was omitted from the final
72
report.
2. Discussion of the Federal Circuit in the Commission Working
Papers
The Federal Circuit received only limited examination in the Working Papers compiled by the Commission, especially in comparison with
66

See

COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT,

67 U.S. CONST. art.

I, § 8; see also

supra note 23, at 64-65.

COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, Sn/na

note

23, at 64-65. See generally I WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 22-25 (1994)

(outlining history of the copyright clause in the Constitution).
68 See COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 23, at 65. For recent exam-

ples, see Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright
Court: Eliminating the .lurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 717
(1999); Allan N. Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our Patent System, 37 IDEA 545 (1997)
(criticizing Federal Circuit's bias toward patent holders and claiming that the circuit fails to
achieve uniformity).
69 See COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 23, at 65; Meador, supra note

37, at 588.
70 COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 23, at 65 ("Today patents are

issued for computer software programs that often are also the subject of copyrights."); Michel,
supra note 28, at 1184-85.
71 COMMISSION TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT, supra note 23, at 65. See generall'y Landau

& Biederman, supra note 68, at 774-784 (advocating a national copyright court modeled on
the Federal Circuit). But cfJ Michel, supra note 28, at 1181, 1183 (questioning the propriety of
expanding Federal Circuit jurisdiction generally, and to include copyright appeals
specifically).
72 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-74.
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the amount of empirical data gathered on the twelve regional circuits.

73

Nevertheless, the Commission did assemble some empirical information
on the Federal Circuit and commissioned two studies of social security
appeals, which it published in the Working Papers.74 Moreover, the
commissioners collected considerable subjective material on the Federal
Circuit, partly by circulating the Commission survey to judges of the
court and attorneys who practice before it. 75
A memorandum prepared by a Federal Judicial Center employee
and included in the Working Papers explained certain case management
practices in the courts of appeals. 7 6 The memorandum showed, for example, that the Federal Circuit is the only circuit in which the staff appears to play no role in nonargument decision making. 77 The Federal
Circuit typically affords plaintiffs and defendants fifteen minutes for oral
arguments, a figure similar to the time allotted by numerous other appeals courts. 78 The Federal Circuit is one of four appellate courts that
have "strict noncitation rules" governing the citability of unpublished
79
opinions.
The commissioners also called for two studies of social security appeals. The first analysis considered whether cases that arise from "denials of social security benefits might be removed from the litigation track"
that results in their appeal to the twelve regional circuits. 8°1 The assessment's findings were essentially inconclusive. However, the study found
that the number of federal appeals involving Social Security cases is
small today, but that "policy shifts and administrative oversight initiatives" could substantially increase these cases.8 ' Therefore, creation of a
73 See supra note 31. See generallv WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17.
74 See WORKING PAPERS, so/na note 17, at 245.
75 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4.
76 See Judith McKenna, Summary of Case Management Practices and Related Issues, in
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 101-16: see also Michel, supra note 28, at 1186 (noting
Judge Michel's opinion that "the court seems to be operating in an increasingly well-organized
and efficient manner" partly by employing "a variety of efficiency measures to cope with a
substantial caseload").
77 See McKenna, supra note 76, at 106-107. See generaly Archer Statement, supra note
38, at 1(14-106 (describing role of Federal Circuit staff and noting impact of increased jurisdiction on staffing requirements).
78 See McKenna, supra note 76, at 109; see also FED. CIR. R. 34, Practice Notes.
79 McKenna, supra note 76, at 116; see also Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of
Opinions: One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909, 916-19 (1986) (affording views of a
Federal Circuit judge on selective publication and citation practices); Michel, supra note 28, at
1186-87 (presenting another Federal Circuit judge's views on these and related matters); Letter
from Federal Circuit Chief Judge Haldane Robert Miller to Circuit Judge Will Garwood,
Chair, Advisory Committee On Appellate Rules (Feb. 25, 1998) (presenting the Federal Circuit's views on these and related matters).
8) Kent Sinclair, Appeals in Social Securit , Cases, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17,
at 245, 247.
81 Id. at 322.
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new court structure might be seen as insurance against the possibility of
expanding Social Security appeals. The study expressed ambivalence,
however, about whether insulation from the prospect of burgeoning cases
through this new structure would be sufficient to motivate congressional
82
action.
The second assessment essentially examined the prospect of creating an Article I court which would resolve social security cases. 8 3 The
study discussed relevant statistical information; analyzed how the federal
courts address Social Security appeals under the present regime; considered numerous systemic problems, such as the lack of reliable and consistent precedent; and concluded that a single appellate court could better
administer the corpus of Social Security law.8 4 The evaluation then reviewed the Federal Courts Study Committee's recommendation that
Congress create an Article I court for Social Security claims85 and further limited this committee's suggestions by proposing that appeals from
this court to the federal appellate courts be permitted only in cases in86
volving constitutional questions.
The Commission also assembled considerable subjective material
on the Federal Circuit by surveying judges who serve on the court and
lawyers who practice before it.87 Federal Circuit judges generally expressed satisfaction with the number of judges Congress now authorizes88 and with the performance of the Federal Circuit's en banc
process. 89

82 See id.

83 See Comments of .ludge John C. Godbold on Creation q" an Article I Social Security
Court, in WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 325.

84 The study, while not "a formal survey," was based upon interviews with magistrate
judges, a court of appeals clerk, and a court of appeals chief staff attorney, as well as research
and the author's "own perceptions." Id. at 325: see also id. at 325-30.
85 See id. at 330; see also FCSC REPORT, supra note 22, at 55-56.
86 The jurisdiction would be more limited in terms of the types of claims and in terms of
the issues that could be appealed. See Godbold, supra note 83, at 330-31. See generally LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 43 (discussing possible additions to and subtractions from
Federal Circuit jurisdiction); supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
87 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 15-35, 72-91.
88 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 18-21 (surveying judges' opinions). See generallv Archer Statement, supra note 38, at 106 (suggesting that "the authorized 12 judgeships
for the Federal Circuit is about right at this time for the job with which lit] is entrusted."). But
see FEDERAL CIRCUIT ANALYSIS, supra note 39, at 3 (stating that "based on the Federal Cir-

cuit's declining caseload and court statistics, serious consideration should be given to whether
this court can do its work with a smaller complement of judges").
89 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 23-25. See generally Slind-Flor, supra note
41 (presenting positive and negative opinions of judges and lawyers regarding the Federal
Circuit).
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Attorneys who responded to the questionnaire voiced considerable
satisfaction with the performance of the Federal Circuit. 9o For example,
among all the appeals courts, the Federal Circuit had the smallest percentage of respondents who indicated that they had a moderate or greater
problem securing needed oral argument or with the court's reliance on
visiting judges on argument panels. 9 1 However, the proportion of attorneys who considered the "difficulty of discerning circuit law due to conflicting precedents" as significant was nearly the highest in the Federal
Circuit, second only to the Ninth Circuit. 92 Moreover, the percentage of
respondents who suggested that "restriction on citation to unpublished
opinions was a moderate or greater problem" was fourth highest in the
93
Federal Circuit.
B.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals collected some objective and considerable subjective material
on the Federal Circuit, which improves understanding of the court today.
The commissioners provided much relevant data and many valuable insights, implying that the Federal Circuit dispenses justice and operates
well by expeditiously resolving cases. 94 Despite this helpful contribution, however, the study lacks the requisite refinement and breadth to
support definitive determinations about the Federal Circuit. Much of the
data which could most convincingly show the court delivers justice or
functions well in fact remains unclear. For example, that attorneys find
the Federal Circuit holds oral arguments in an adequate number of appeals offers little guidance about how the court operates. 95 Comparing
these ideas and material among all the appeals courts seems equally uninformative, because the cases, resources, and responses to docket
growth differ in each circuit. The peculiar nature of the technical issues
90 See WORKING PAPERS, supWa note 17, at 72-91; see also supra note 17 and accompa-

nying text.
91 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 105 tbl.3c, 108 tbl.6b.
92 Id. at 86, Item 2 0g; see also id. at 87, Item 20j (showing that the court was second
highest in the category in which "unpredictability of results until the panel's identity is known"
is a "grave problem"). For additional discussion of these issues, see Hellman, supra note 3, at
398-99; Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit

Jurisprudence ftm the New Centurn,, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (1994); Michel, supra note 28, at
1191-93; Slind-Flor, supra note 41, at Al, 16.
93 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 113 tbl.12; see also supra note 79 and accompa-

nying text (suggesting that the Federal Circuit's "strict noncitation rules" might explain this
survey result); Michel, supra note 28, at 1186-87 (discussing those rules); Hellman, supra note
3, at 399 (suggesting the "need for caution in interpreting the survey results").
94 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 77, Item 13; accord Michel, supra note 28, at
1186.
95 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 86, Item 20h.
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often raised by appeals in the Federal Circuit also complicates this
96
situation.
The Commission aptly observed that the varied amount of detail in
"without comment" dispositions and diverse record-keeping methods
prevent reliable comparisons of the appeals courts along this dimension
using nationally reported data. 97 Even if the existing information were
clearer, the material might not accurately capture overall circuit operations which encompass a spectrum ranging from rather mundane daily
court administration, to the esoteric concept of judicial collegiality. 98
The Federal Circuit's present condition, thus, might resist precise characterization without the collection, analysis, and synthesis of additional and
more refined material through, for example, the scrutiny of numerous
cases. 99
In fairness, the commissioners did not claim that they thoroughly
examined individual courts or considered all relevant empirical data. Instead, the Commission explored some benefits and disadvantages of enlarging Federal Circuit jurisdiction without proffering
recommendations. " "' For example, it is useful to have opinions that the
Federal Circuit performs effectively and that tax and social security appeals might be assigned to the court. However, these perspectives are
somewhat controversial and could be tested empirically or more easily
understood with carefully assembled empirical data.
The objective information and the subjective material which the
commissioners collected lack sufficient refinement and comprehensiveness to support concrete determinations about how the Federal Circuit
operates and whether the court's jurisdiction warrants expansion. Nonetheless, this information is adequate to substantiate several specific recommendations for future action.
96 See Michel, supra note 28, at 1186: see also Ringel, supra note 32, at 10 (quoting U.S.
Chamber of Commerce's characterization of the comparison between caseloads of the Federal
Circuit and the regional circuits as "apples to oranges").
97 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 11l.This phenomenon and diverse case complex-

ity suggest the need to refine data. The Commission refines some data. For instance, the
commissioners do not consider a circuit's senior judges as visitors. See id. at 108 tbl.6a.
98 See generally FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 215 (1994) (offering a "hombook" defi-

nition of collegiality); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiali, and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-64 (1998) (describing role of collegiality in decisional
processes); Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L. J. 585
(1995) (analyzing impact of collegiality on judicial decision making).
99 For claims that the court works well under the current system, see Michel, supra note
28, at 1186. But cJ: Helen Wilson Nies, State of the Court, Address Before the Eleventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (June
18, 1993), in 153 F.R.D. 177, 185 (1993) (discussing both positive and negative aspects of the
work of the court).
Io1

See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 72-74.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The Commission provides a balanced, albeit rather circumscribed,
analysis of the benefits and disadvantages of including new categories of
appeals within Federal Circuit jurisdiction. The commissioners' decision
to discuss two candidates absent suggestion is informative, but treatment
in greater detail could have further advanced the inquiry. For example,
several important developments will apparently foster much patent law
litigation in the near future. These include rapid, dramatic change in
numerous areas of technology, including electronic commerce and biotechnology, as well as a broader interpretation of statutory subject matter,
leading to controversial patents for biotechnology, software, and business
methods. "1 " The Commission was, and Congress should be, cautious
about expanding the jurisdiction of a court that may soon experience sub10 2
stantial docket growth.
Transferring cases to the Federal Circuit would probably afford certain general benefits. For instance, diverting a number of appeals from
the twelve regional circuits would somewhat relieve their burgeoning
dockets. Moreover, vesting jurisdiction over these cases in the Federal
Circuit may capitalize on specialized expertise that judges of this court
now have or would secure by virtue of having a comparatively narrow
caseload. This approach might, however, afford minimal gain and even
entail certain disadvantages. Transferring appeals to the Federal Circuit
from the regional circuits would effect no actual reduction in filings; the
appellate judiciary as a whole would continue processing the identical
total number of cases. The new cases may concomitantly burden the
Federal Circuit at a time when it is experiencing docket growth.
Judges of the Federal Circuit have no particular expertise in resolving social security disputes and have limited expertise in deciding tax
matters. Both social security and tax appeals differ significantly from
those cases that the court currently receives. Therefore, vesting the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over these two categories of cases may not
3
expedite appeals, yield systemic economies, or be fairer to litigants.t If
lO See, e.g., AT&T v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F. 3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999) ("IAI mathematical algorithm may be an integral part
of patentable subject matter such as a machine or process if the claimed invention as a whole is
applied in a 'useful' manner"); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc., 149 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (rejecting the notion
that business methods and computer algorithms are unpatentable per se); Animal Legal Def.
Fund v. Quigg, 932 F. 2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See generally Landau & Biederman, supra
note 68 (discussing the complexities of copyright for courts); Michel, supra note 28, at 118485 (noting that scientific and business advances will elicit calls for increased specialization of
the Federal Circuit).
102 See Michel, supra note 28, at 1181-83, 1193-94.
103 See U.S. Department of Justice, Comment on the Tentative Draft Report of the Com-

mission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 6, 1998), at http://
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Congress expands the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit, it might include
cases most similar to those the court presently resolves. In short, although social security and tax controversies are oft-mentioned candidates, they may not be the best prospects; Congress might want to assess
them more closely or explore other possibilities.I'm
The Commission's decision to delete from the final report its discussion of copyright cases in the tentative draft report seems sensible.1 n5
Judges of the Federal Circuit have little specialized expertise in this field,
which minimally overlaps with patent law, while the twelve regional circuits, and in particular the Second Circuit, have traditionally resolved
copyright cases. 116 Moreover, technological growth in the intemet and
software, as well as the increasing complexity of Title 17 of the United
States Code, mean that there will be greater and increasingly complicated
copyright litigation in the future.1 7 Given the Federal Circuit's current
areas of expertise, Congress should probably not give it responsibility for
these complex cases.
The Federal Circuit and Congress might also consider implementing
additional actions. Because the commissioners devoted so much attention to the remaining appeals courts, especially the Ninth Circuit, the
Federal Circuit warrants greater study. Further analysis would help determine the propriety of vesting in the court jurisdiction over tax, social
security, and other cases. Indeed, the Judicial Conference Long Range
Planning Committee admonished that the "need for centralized review by
the Federal Circuit in any subject area might be reevaluated from time to
time in light of developments in the law and changes in the workload and
structure of the other courts of appeals."'' °8 The Federal Circuit and
lawmakers may wish to assess those areas in which the court might perform better, as suggested by responses to the Commission survey11t 9
Consistency and predictability in circuit law should be considered, al-

app.comm.uscourts.gov/report/comments/DOJ.htm. See generally Tobias, supra note 8, at 234
(reviewing past and present external reforms in the federal appellate system); Wilinsky, supra
note 61, at 1087 (noting that vesting federal jurisdiction would not necessarily help social
security benefits litigants).
104 Cases involving intellectual property law are one possibility.
105 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
106 See Douglas Y' Barbo, The Origin of the Contemporary Standard for Copyright Infi'ingement, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 285, 285 (1999).
107 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Of course, placing jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit would be responsive to the concerns about inconsistency and forum shopping that
plagued patent attorneys when the Hruska Commission surveyed them in 1975. See, e.g., Littman, supra note 68; see also supra note 69.
l08 LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 35, at 43.
109 See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 17, at 5-91.
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though they are somewhat elusive notions. Several studies of these concepts, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, should be instructive.' "I
If evaluation shows that the Federal Circuit presently encounters
difficulties requiring remediation, evaluators must attempt to delineate
exactly why. This will facilitate the careful tailoring of solutions to existing circumstances. For instance, should analysis reveal that circuit law
is not uniform or predictable; the court may want to implement or refine
promising approaches. These include the circulation of opinions to all
circuit judges before a final opinion is published, which some regional
circuits have successfully employed.''' The court might also consider
experimenting with additional measures that may promote efficiency,
12
such as the "pilot reforms" explored by Judge Michel.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
of Appeals has collected considerable objective and subjective information on the Federal Circuit. However, that material is neither sufficiently
refined nor thorough to permit definitive conclusions about the court.
Therefore, Congress and the Federal Circuit judges should continue studying the Federal Circuit, particularly by exploring potential candidates
for inclusion within the court's jurisdictions.

110 See McKenna, supra note 76, at 93-95; Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency
in the Law of the Large Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 55-96 (Arthur Hellman ed., 1990); Arthur
D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. PITT. L. REV.
1029 (1999).
1 11 See, e.g., 3D CIR. I.O.P. 5.6: 4TH CIR I.O.P. 36.2; see also Slind-Flor, supra note 41
(noting that the circuit uses prepublication circulation among technical advisors); NINTH CIR.
EVALUATION COMM., INTERIM REPORT 8-12 (2000) (pointing out that case management attorneys in the 9th Circuit circulate pre-publication reports daily).
112 Michel, supra note 28, at 1200-02. Judge Michel suggests a number of "pilot reforms," including unsigned or per curiam opinions that tersely declare the essential rationale
agreed to by the three members of the panel (which would reduce the delays of lengthy, signed
opinions), and shorter oral opinions from the bench, supplemented later by more detailed written opinions. Id.

